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Using path analysis, we investigate the direct and indirect links between three measures of earnings quality 
and the cost of equity.  Our investigation is motivated by analytical models that specify both a direct link 
and an indirect link that is mediated by information asymmetry, but do not suggest which link would be 
more important empirically.  We measure information asymmetry as both the adverse selection component 
of the bid-ask spread and PIN (the probability of informed trading).  For a large sample of Value Line firms 
during 1993-2005, we find statistically reliable evidence of both a direct path from earnings quality to the 
cost of equity, and an indirect path that is mediated by information asymmetry, with the weight of the 
evidence favoring the direct path as the more important. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Applying path analysis to a sample of Value Line firms during 1993-2005, we posit and test 
for evidence of a direct link (path) between the cost of equity capital and information risk as 
proxied by earnings quality, and an indirect link, in which information asymmetry is a mediator 
variable that is influenced by earnings quality and that in turn influences the cost of equity.  Our 
investigation is motivated by the theoretical debate about whether earnings quality affects the cost 
of capital through its effect on information asymmetry and by the policy implications of the answer 
to that question. 
We build on three streams of research that consider the relation between accounting-based 
information variables and market outcomes, including information asymmetry and the cost of 
equity, and the relation between those market outcomes.  The first stream investigates links 
between earnings quality and information asymmetry.  For example, Bhattacharya et al. (2009) 
document that poor earnings quality results in higher adverse selection risk and lower financial 
market liquidity.  The second stream of research contains analytical models that specify how either 
the amount of information risk (that is, the quality or precision of information) or the distribution 
of information (that is, information asymmetry) relates to the cost of equity.  Lambert et al. (2008) 
specify a direct link between information risk and the cost of equity and, in some circumstances, 
suggest an indirect link that operates through information asymmetry.1  We aim to provide 
evidence on the existence and relative importance of both the direct link and the indirect link.  In 
addition, based on Lambert et al. (2007), we posit and test for an indirect link between earnings 
quality and the cost of equity that is mediated by beta. 
                                                     
1 Easley and O’Hara (2004) also predict a link from information asymmetry to the cost of equity.  However, Lambert et al. (2008) 
show that in Easley and O’Hara’s pure competition setting, changing information asymmetry can affect the cost of equity only if 
that change also affects investors’ average level of information precision. 
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The third stream of research which forms the foundation for our analysis provides evidence 
on associations between measures of earnings quality and the cost of equity and, separately, 
between measures of information asymmetry and the cost of equity.  With regard to the latter, 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that bid-ask spreads are related to expected returns, and 
Easley et al. (2002) provide evidence that the probability of informed trading (PIN) is related to 
expected returns. With regard to the former, several recent studies document a relation between the 
cost of equity and information risk as captured by earnings quality (we provide an overview in 
section II).  However, this research does not investigate how this association operates and, in fact, 
often appears to attribute the association to an indirect path mediated by information asymmetry.  
Our aim is to shed light on the extent to which this attribution is confirmed by empirical analyses. 
Our measures of the cost of equity, earnings quality and information asymmetry follow 
prior research.  We use a Value-Line-forecast-based measure of the cost of equity, based on 
previous research (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee 2005, Botosan et al. 2009) demonstrating the 
construct validity of this measure.  In sensitivity tests, we also use a realized-returns-based measure 
and two measures based on earnings forecasts.  We measure earnings quality as accruals quality (as 
defined by Dechow and Dichev 2002), as absolute abnormal accruals from a modified Jones (1991) 
model and as a composite measure that combines accruals quality, absolute abnormal accruals and 
earnings variability.  We measure information asymmetry as the adverse selection component of 
the bid-ask spread, following Huang and Stoll (1996), and as PIN, following Easley et al. (2002). 
We first verify that our sample exhibits cost of equity associations similar to the 
associations found in previous research.  We next use path analysis to decompose the associations 
into a direct path from earnings quality to the cost of equity and an indirect path mediated by 
information asymmetry; we perform separate tests in which beta is an additional mediating 
variable.  For all three measures of earnings quality, we find statistically reliable evidence of both a 
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direct path and an indirect path, mediated by information asymmetry, between earnings quality and 
the cost of equity, as well as evidence of an indirect path mediated by beta.  The direct path is 
empirically more important than the indirect path(s), and the relative importance of the direct 
versus the indirect path varies predictably with the market environment.  Specifically, consistent 
with arguments in Lambert et al. (2008), when market friction is high, information asymmetry is 
relatively more important as a mediating variable.  Results are broadly consistent for our two 
measures of information asymmetry, except that the PIN association is sensitive to size effects. 
We interpret our results as supporting the predictions of analytical models which posit both 
a direct path and a mediated path from information risk, which we proxy by earnings quality, to the 
cost of equity.  We also conclude that the attribution of the association between measures of 
earnings quality and the cost of equity to the information-asymmetry-mediated (indirect) path, 
made by Francis et al. (2005) and several other studies, is incomplete.  Our results thus provide 
evidence about the nature of the relation between information risk and the cost of equity.  While 
the existence of such a relation is predicted by analytical models, those models do not speak to the 
magnitudes of associations or to the possibility that both direct and indirect relations can exist, as 
an empirical matter, in a broad sample of firms.   
Our finding that, in broad samples, the direct link between information risk and the cost of 
equity dominates the link mediated by information asymmetry suggests that when there is a trade-
off between the two, increasing the quality of information has a bigger payoff, in the sense of 
favorable cost of equity effects, than does ensuring equal investor access to information (that is, 
reducing information asymmetry).  In the context of management’s reporting and disclosure 
decisions, our results suggest that efforts to simplify reporting and otherwise make the information 
more broadly understandable should be evaluated also by the effects of those efforts on information 
precision.  In a regulatory context, requirements intended to affect the distribution of information 
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(that is, information asymmetry) without altering the overall average precision of information 
include Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD)2 and prohibitions on insider trading.  As discussed in 
Lambert et al. (2008) critics of Reg FD argued that it could reduce the amount and quality of 
information available to investors (that is, reduce information precision) and critics of insider 
trading prohibitions (e.g., Manne 1966, 2005) argue that these prohibitions impede the ability of 
better-informed insiders to enhance price discovery by their informed trading.  Our results suggest 
that these and similar regulatory requirements would be expected to have a favorable overall cost 
of equity effect only if they do not reduce average information precision, for example, by 
discouraging actions that put more precise information into the marketplace.3  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II summarizes the  research relating 
information variables to the cost of equity that forms the basis for our analysis and explains how 
these relations can be described and measured by path analysis.  Section III describes our measures 
of earnings quality, information asymmetry and the cost of equity.  Section IV reports the empirical 
results and section V concludes. 
II.  INFORMATION RISK AND THE COST OF EQUITY 
 Our investigation of the direct and indirect paths between earnings quality, our proxy for 
information risk, and the cost of equity is guided by analytical models that we interpret as 
supporting the possibility of both links.  We use ‘information risk’ to denote both information 
precision effects and information asymmetry effects, and distinguish between models in which 
properties of firm-specific information are rationally priced along two related dimensions.  The 
first is whether information risk derives from the amount of information uncertainty (or 
                                                     
2 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure on August 15, 2000.  The stated intent is to 
address selective disclosure of information.  The Regulation requires that an SEC registrant that discloses material nonpublic 
information to certain individuals (e.g., analysts, large investors) must also make the information public.   
3 We recognize that policymakers may choose to accept reduced average information precision to achieve a social goal of equitable 
information distribution; the considerations involved in analyzing this tradeoff lie outside the scope of our paper. 
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imprecision, which we interpret as a measure of quality) or from the distribution of information; 
that is, from information asymmetry.  The second dimension is whether the effects of information 
uncertainty are direct or mediated.  Focusing on the amount of information imprecision, earnings 
quality as an indicator of information imprecision directly affects the cost of equity capital.  
Focusing on the distribution of information, the effect of earnings quality is indirect, mediated by 
information asymmetry.  The basic structure can be represented by a path diagram, where the 
relations are represented by path arrows: 
 
Figure 1:  Basic path diagram showing posited direct and indirect (mediated by information asymmetry) 
paths between earnings quality (our proxy for information risk) and the cost of equity. 
 
 
II.1  Path analysis of the links between earnings quality and cost of equity.    
We use path analysis to decompose the correlation between the source (causal) variable 
earnings quality and the outcome variable cost of equity into direct and indirect (mediated) paths.   
This decomposition provides evidence on the existence and relative importance of the direct and 
indirect paths between earnings quality and the cost of equity. 4  Path analysis belongs to a class of 
causal (or structural equation) models that are used to provide persuasive explanations of 
correlation structures, by decomposing a correlation between two variables (in our case, earnings 
quality and the cost of equity) into a simple or direct path and a compound or indirect path that 
                                                     
4 For additional description, see, for example, Asher (1983). Path analysis has been more used in auditing and managerial 
accounting research than in capital markets research.   For example, Ramsay and Payne (2007) use path analysis to investigate how 
two distinct audit documentation approaches (summary memos versus detailed audit workpapers) affect audit outcomes such as 
error identification and fraud detection, via mediating variables such as time spent on the documentation task and intensity of 
examinations of audit evidence.  Bouwens and Abernethy (2000) examine the relation between the design of management 
accounting systems (the outcome variable) and both customization (meaning that the customer affects the attributes of the item 
being purchased) and interdepartmental dependence, and find that customization operates on the outcome variable via departmental 
dependence, not directly.  Also in managerial accounting, Parker and Kyj (2006) show that the outcome variable job performance is 
due to a complicated set of direct and mediated paths involving budget participation, organizational commitment, information 
sharing and ambiguity. 
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includes a mediating variable (in our case, information asymmetry).5  The primary path analysis we 
consider is recursive (all the paths flow in only one direction) and consists of manifest (observable) 
variables; when some variables are unobservable (latent) the models are sometimes called 
LISREL-type models.   
Path analysis can be compared to regression analysis along three dimensions that are 
pertinent to our research question.  First, like a standard regression where one specifies a dependent 
variable as a function of explanatory variables, path analysis requires the researcher to postulate 
source or causal variables, mediating variables (influenced by source variables and influencing 
outcome variables) and outcome or consequent variables. 6  This ex ante specification can be 
derived from theory or from substantive, knowledge-based reasoning about the linkages among 
variables or from both.  Our specification of the direct and mediated paths between earnings quality 
and the cost of equity is guided by the analytical models discussed in section II.2 and by previous 
empirical research, discussed in section II.3.   Second, while regression analysis is informative 
about overall effects, path analysis provides evidence about the existence and relative importance 
of the possible alternative paths of influence that, taken together, create those overall effects. Third, 
path analysis allows for multiple source variables, each with its own set of direct and indirect paths, 
and for detection and analysis of correlations among source variables.  If two source variables are 
statistically related, but only one influences a mediating or outcome variable, in a path analysis this 
relation will appear as a simple correlation between the two variables that is not part of the path 
between each source variable and the mediating or outcome variables.  Although causal variables 
may covary,  there is no path between causal variables (the researcher does not posit a directional 
                                                     
5 This description of path analysis focuses on Figure 1, with information asymmetry as the mediating variable between earnings 
quality and the cost of equity.  As discussed later, we also investigate several alternative and more complex specifications.   
6 Unlike standard regressions, path analysis can also be used to investigate alternative theory-based links in the same analysis.  We 
provide such an analysis in section IV.3.2, where we investigate a potential feed-back link between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry. 
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link between them).  In a regression, this potential covariation effect is not as readily detectable and 
separable from the actual paths of influence, and in fact may not be detectable at all.  For example, 
in specifications that include, as source variables, beta, size and book-to-market (BM) (Fama and 
French 1993), we allow for a direct path between each factor and the cost of equity (these variables 
act like control variables in a regression). 
 The key outputs of a path analysis are  path coefficients linking two variables in the path.  A 
direct path has one path coefficient.7  A mediated path contains a coefficient linking the source 
variable to the mediating variable and a coefficient linking the mediating variable to the outcome 
variable.  The path coefficient for a mediated path is the product of the individual path coefficients 
for each segment of that path.  In our setting, the total mediated path coefficient between earnings 
quality and the cost of equity is the product of the path coefficient between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry and the path coefficient between information asymmetry and the cost of 
equity.  We measure the importance of a direct or indirect path, which we term percentage, as the 
ratio of the path coefficient for that path to the total correlation between the source variable and the 
outcome variable.  For example, the ratio of the mediated path coefficient to the correlation 
between earnings quality and the cost of equity is the proportion of the total correlation between 
earnings quality and the cost of equity that is attributable to the mediated or indirect path, which 
captures the relative importance of that path. 
II.2  Analytical models that link information risk directly to the cost of equity and indirectly, 
through information asymmetry or beta.   
 Lambert et al. (2008) show that in a perfect competition setting, the average precision of 
investors’ assessments of firms’ future cash flows directly affects the cost of equity.  The extent to 
                                                     
7 In a simple model such as the one described in Figure 1, the path coefficient for the direct path from EQ to CofE represents the link 
between EQ and CofE when EQ has been orthogonalized with respect to IA; that is, any shared variation between EQ and IA has 
been removed and only the unique EQ-CofE association remains. 
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which any single investor’s information precision differs from the market average precision (the 
extent of information asymmetry among investors ) does not matter as long as the average 
precision is controlled for.  In their model, when some investors acquire more information (have 
more precise information), this additional information gets partially communicated through price, 
thereby decreasing the uncertainty of other investors.  Alternatively, providing more information to 
more investors (one way to describe how to reduce information uncertainty) affects the cost of 
equity only because the additional information increases the average level of information precision.  
Based on this model, we posit a direct path from earnings quality (our proxy for information risk) 
to the cost of equity capital.   
Our reading of the literature (e.g., Hughes et al. 2007, Lambert et al. 2008) suggests that 
some kind of capital market imperfection or friction is required to support a link between 
information asymmetry and the cost of equity.  As Lambert et al. point out, researchers have 
characterized imperfectly competitive capital markets in several ways; they choose Diamond and 
Verrecchia’s (1991) characterization in which the market contains a small number of large risk 
neutral traders who are at least potentially informed and a large number of less informed risk 
averse traders.  We interpret Lambert et al. (2008) as implying the possibility of an indirect link 
from earnings quality to the cost of equity that is mediated by information asymmetry, provided the 
capital market is not perfectly competitive (which they characterize by reference to the 
composition of the investor base and investor characteristics).  To the extent this characterization 
captures important aspects of the information and trading environment for a given sample of firms, 
that environment would be viewed as imperfectly competitive and thus offering the empirical 
possibility of an indirect path between information risk and the cost of equity.8 
                                                     
8  Previous empirical research analyzing the capital market effects of information quality (e.g., Francis et al. 2005) has been 
motivated by O’Hara’s (2003) and Easley and O’Hara’s (2004) model of the consequences of information asymmetry in a capital 
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If information asymmetry is a mediating variable that affects the cost of equity, it is 
necessary to identify a source or causal variable that affects information asymmetry.  Both Lambert 
et al. and Easley and O’Hara point to accounting information as one such variable.  We focus on 
accounting quality, more specifically, earnings quality, as the source variable that is mediated by 
information asymmetry, both because it has a natural interpretation as a measure of information 
risk and because of its direct link to cash flows, the presumed object of investor interest.  Because 
earnings quality is determined by the reporting entity’s business model, operating environment and 
implementation of authoritative accounting guidance, it is not itself a characteristic of the capital 
market (as is, for example, analyst following).9 
Lambert et al. (2007) develop a model, based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
in which information quality affects the cost of equity via an influence on systematic risk, specified 
as the (unobservable) forward-looking beta.10  As both they and their discussant (Indjejikian 2007) 
point out, in their CAPM-based model only one factor is priced, so their model cannot suggest a 
direct link between earnings quality (our proxy for information quality) and the cost of equity.  We 
present a path analysis which allows for both the effect predicted by Lambert et al. (2007) 
(earnings quality affects the cost of equity indirectly, via beta) and a direct effect which is not 
                                                                                                                                                                               
market characterized by rational expectations and differentially informed investors.  O’Hara (2003) and Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
identify the composition of information, between public information and private information, as a determinant of the cost of equity.  
In their model, uninformed investors face an undiversifiable risk that arises from asymmetric information; an increase in the amount 
of private information, that is, an increase in information asymmetry, increases the required rate of return. Lambert et al. (2008) 
dispute that it is information asymmetry per se that causes the cost of capital effect in pure competition settings, such as in Easley 
and O’Hara (2004).  Rather, reducing information asymmetry can affect the cost of equity when the reduction in asymmetry is 
accompanied by an increase in the average level of information precision. 
9 As a practical matter, information asymmetry is determined by factors that affect how (relatively) informed are the uninformed 
investors.  Lambert et al. (2008) note that factors that reduce information asymmetry may also increase the average precision of 
information.  Some of these factors are in turn associated with other capital market characteristics.  Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
suggest, for example, that greater analyst scrutiny of a given firm will increase the dispersion of information about that firm across 
investors and thereby reduce information asymmetry.  Previous research shows that analyst coverage is similarly determined by 
other capital market characteristics such as investor interest; for example, O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) find that analysts follow 
firms that institutions hold and institutions hold firms that analysts follow.  Therefore, while analyst following would be expected to 
affect both average information precision and information asymmetry, analyst following appears to be a variable that is not itself a 
direct measure of information imprecision. 
10 This effect is similar to the estimation risk (or parameter uncertainty) link between information  and systematic risk developed by, 
for example, Barry and Brown (1985) and Klein and Bawa (1976).   
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predicted by their model but which might exist in a multi-factor asset pricing scenario.  Our 
measure of systematic risk is the CAPM beta estimated from historical data.11  
In summary, we believe the analytical literature suggests that the existence and relative 
importance of direct and indirect (mediated by information asymmetry or systematic risk) paths 
from earnings quality to the cost of equity are empirical matters.  Recognizing that actual capital 
market outcomes reflect conditions that may not be completely captured by any single analytical 
specification, our analyses test for the existence and relative importance of  both direct and indirect 
links between information quality and the cost of equity.  With regard to the direct link, we propose 
that poor earnings quality represents imprecise information about firms’ future cash flows and 
thereby increases the cost of equity capital.  With regard to the indirect links, prior research shows 
that poor earnings quality is associated with higher information asymmetry (e.g., Bhattacharya et 
al. 2009) and with higher systematic risk (e.g., Francis et al. 2005, Barth et al. 2006).  We therefore 
propose indirect paths from earnings quality through information asymmetry and systematic risk. 
II.3  Evidence on the links between information risk, information asymmetry and the cost of equity. 
 Our analysis is predicated on the existence of empirical relations between the cost of equity 
and measures of both information quality and information asymmetry.  In this section, we describe 
empirical research that documents a link between accounting-based proxies for information risk 
(specifically, measures of earnings quality) and the cost of equity and a link between measures of 
information asymmetry and the cost of equity. 
 Earnings quality and the cost of equity.  As described in section III, we measure earnings 
quality as accruals quality, absolute abnormal accruals and a composite factor based on the first 
two quality measures plus earnings variability.  These accounting-based measures of information 
                                                     
11 Because this measure is a noisy proxy for the forward-looking beta, the construct specified by Lambert et al., we acknowledge 
that the use of this noisy proxy could affect our results. 
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risk focus on the association between accruals (which link the outcomes of operating the firm’s 
business model to reporting outcomes via management’s implementation of authoritative 
accounting guidance) and accounting fundamentals (cash flows or property, plant and equipment 
and revenues).  These measures capture effects of the firm’s operating environment, not its trading 
environment, so they are likely to influence, as opposed to being influenced by, the market’s 
information structure.  In particular, accruals quality captures the uncertainty in current accruals 
about cash flows, and is therefore directly connected to the valuation construct in the analytical 
models that guide our research. 
 Previous research has investigated the relation between various accounting-based and 
market-based measures of earnings quality and various measures of the cost of equity, including 
valuation-model-based measures and realized-returns-based measures.  Examples include 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003), Barone (2003), Francis et al. (2004, 2005), Aboody, et al. (2005), Barth 
et al. (2006), Berger et al. (2006),  Chen et al. (2008), Core et al. (2008), Gray et al. (2008),  Kravet 
and Shevlin (2009), Ogneva (2009), and Kim and Qi (2010).  For a detailed discussion of this and 
related research, see Francis et al. (2008).12 
 Earnings quality and information asymmetry. Using the adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread as the proxy for information asymmetry, Bhattacharya et al. (2009) find that 
earnings quality affects the level of information asymmetry during non-earnings-announcement 
periods as well as the change in information asymmetry around earnings announcement windows.  
These effects persist after controlling for known determinants of bid-ask spreads.  Welker (1995) 
and Brown and Hillegeist (2007) document associations between disclosure policy as proxied by 
                                                     
12 Briefly, these studies find an economically and statistically significant cost of equity effect associated with earnings quality.  An 
exception is Core et al., who fail to find a significant risk premium associated with accruals quality using a two-stage test.  As 
pointed out in Kravet and Shevlin (2009), the two-stage test also fails to find significant risk premia associated with models of 
fundamental risk such as the CAPM and the Fama and French three-factor model. 
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AIMR scores and two measures of information asymmetry: bid-ask spreads (Welker) and PIN 
scores (Brown and Hillegeist). 
Information asymmetry and the cost of equity.   We measure information asymmetry as the 
adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads (the price impact (Impact)), and PIN (probability-
of-informed-trading) scores.   Our estimate of price impact follows Huang and Stoll (1996), and is 
described in section III.  Price impact has been used in the market microstructure literature (e.g., 
Bessembinder and Kaufman 1997, Stoll 2000, Wahal, Conrad and Johnson 2003) and also by 
market regulators.13 It has to our knowledge not been tested explicitly as a determinant of expected 
returns.  Variants of bid-ask spread variables have, however, been found to have explanatory power 
for expected returns; for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that raw bid-ask spreads are 
positively related to expected returns.  While bid-ask spreads are related to firm size, Amihud and 
Mendelson document that size does not drive out the expected return effect associated with bid-ask 
spreads (if anything, size loses importance in the presence of the bid-ask spread).  Using two 
measures of the variable and fixed costs of transacting, one of which includes the adverse selection 
component, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find a significant return premium, controlling for 
the Fama-French 3-factor model, associated with the variable and fixed trading cost components. 
The theoretical development, estimation and properties of PIN as a measure of information 
asymmetry are described in several places, including Easley, Hvidkjær and O’Hara (2002), who 
also document an association between PIN and measures of expected returns.  PIN has been used 
to measure information asymmetry in the financial economics literature and in the accounting 
literature (e.g., Brown et al. 2004, Botosan and Plumlee 2008, LaFond and Watts 2008), and we 
thus consider it as an alternative to Impact.  However, size-PIN interactions documented and 
                                                     
13 From September 2001, the SEC has required each U.S. stock “market center” to compile and disseminate, on a monthly basis, 
various standardized measures of execution quality to provide traders with information on the execution quality of their trades (SEC 
Rule 605, formerly 11Ac1-5).  These measures include the effective spread and the price impact of trade metrics (Boehmer, 2005). 
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discussed by, for example, Easley et al. (2002, p. 2208), Easley et al. (2005), Botosan and Plumlee 
(2008) and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) suggest that PIN effects can be more sensitive to how 
firm size is included in the research design than are Impact effects.  
 Finally, Botosan and Plumlee’s (2008) analysis of information asymmetry and the cost of 
equity is complementary to our results.  They are interested in both the public versus private 
composition of information and the dissemination of private information across investors as 
measures of information asymmetry.  They conclude that information composition, information 
dissemination and the precision of private and public information are all associated with the cost of 
equity.  They investigate in detail how different information asymmetry attributes are priced, so 
their study is in the same spirit as ours.  However, their analysis is not concerned with the path 
through which information risk is linked to the cost of equity. 
II.4  Innate versus discretionary portions of earnings quality. 
 The models of information risk that form the basis for our analysis do not distinguish 
between the innate and the discretionary (or reporting choice) portion of earnings quality.  
However, both research on earnings management and knowledge of how the financial reporting 
process works suggest a difference between the imprecision of accruals for cash flows that arises 
from fundamentals innate to a firm’s business model and its operating environment, and the 
imprecision that arises from management’s period-by-period implementation of accounting 
guidance (that is, from reporting decisions).  For consistency with previous research we refer to the 
former as innate earnings quality and the latter as discretionary earnings quality, recognizing that 
management can, over time, alter both business models and operating environments (e.g., by 
acquisition and divestiture) and that reporting choices are not purely discretionary (i.e., free 
choice), but rather subject to authoritative guidance.   
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 The empirical associations between innate and discretionary earnings quality and the cost of 
equity differ.  For example, Francis et al. (2005) report that the discretionary portion of accruals 
quality has a smaller cost of equity effect than does innate accruals quality, a finding confirmed by 
other studies.  These results are predictable in light of the findings and related discussion in Guay 
et al. (1996) and Healy’s (1996) related discussion.  In the context of our analysis, their point is 
that a broad sample of financial reporting outcomes covering a long period will include reporting 
decisions that increase informativeness or reporting quality, decisions intended to manipulate the 
reporting outcome (and thereby reduce reporting quality), and decisions that introduce noise.  Since 
a broad sample reflects an unknown mixture of the three types of reporting outcomes, which are in 
turn captured by discretionary earnings quality measures, the cost of equity effects of discretionary 
earnings quality should be smaller in a broad sample than the effects of innate earnings quality, 
because the latter reflects the imprecision introduced by innate factors, and not a mixture of 
potentially offsetting effects. 
 Based on this previous research, we include tests that separate innate from discretionary 
earnings quality.  Either component, or both, could have a direct effect and/or a mediated effect on 
the cost of equity and the form of those effects could differ for the two components.  For example, 
while we expect that information asymmetry is influenced by management’s reporting decisions, it 
is possible that management may make reporting decisions to reduce information asymmetry.  
Thus, there may be a path from discretionary earnings quality to information asymmetry as well as 
a feedback path in the reverse direction.  We address specification issues in section IV.3.2. 
III.  EMPIRICAL MEASURES AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
III.1  Measures of earnings quality, information asymmetry and cost of equity 
Earnings quality.  Because the analytical models we rely on tend to focus on the precision 
of information and to view cash flows as fundamental, we believe our research question calls for 
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accounting-based earnings quality measures that capture the precision of earnings with respect to 
accounting fundamentals that are meant to capture the value generating process of the firm, 
especially cash flows. 14  Prior research by Francis et al. (2004) finds that accounting-based 
earnings attributes (in particular accruals quality, earnings persistence, and smoothness) have larger 
cost of equity effects than market-based attributes (value relevance, timeliness and conservatism); 
accruals quality is empirically the strongest of the accounting-based attributes they consider.  
Francis et al. (2004) also report that earnings variability has about the same cost of equity effect as 
accruals quality, and Aboody et al. (2005) as well as Francis et al. (2005) report that absolute 
abnormal accruals from a Jones (1991) model have non-trivial capital market effects.15  Based on 
these results, and following the reasoning that the most appropriate measures of earnings quality 
for our purposes should focus on accounting fundamentals, we use accruals quality (AQ), absolute 
abnormal accruals (|AA|) and a composite measure that contains AQ, |AA| and earnings variability 
as our proxies for earnings quality. 
We define accruals quality as the time-series standard deviation of residuals in regressions 
of working capital accruals on past, present and future cash flows from operations, plus the change 
in revenues and property, plant and equipment (Dechow and Dichev 2002, McNichols 2002).  We 
measure the absolute value of abnormal accruals, |AA|, following a modified Jones (1991) 
approach.  The estimation details can be found in Francis et al. (2005).  Our composite earnings 
quality measure is the common factor score obtained from a factor analysis of AQ, AA  and 
                                                     
14 The accounting literature has used three types of operationalizations of earnings quality:  the accounting-fundamentals based 
measures we use; external assessments such as analyst rankings of financial report quality  (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993, Botosan 
and Plumlee 2002); and market-based measures in which the quality of financial reporting is judged by its ability to capture the 
information that is already in returns or prices.  For example, value relevance and timeliness metrics associate quality with the 
contemporaneous association between stock returns and earnings, while conservatism associates quality with differential 
associations of positive (good news) versus negative (bad news) stock returns with earnings (e.g., Basu 1997).  For discussions of 
earnings quality, see, for example, Schipper and Vincent (2003), Dechow and Schrand (2004), and Francis et al. (2008). 
15  We are not aware of direct comparisons of the cost of capital effects of analyst based measures of earnings quality (such as 
AIMR scores) with the effects of other earnings quality proxies.  However, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) report that the associations 
between AIMR scores and their measures of the cost of capital are weak and inconsistent. 
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earnings variability, measured as the standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items, 
scaled by total assets, over the same seven year period used in the AQ calculation.  For all three 
variables, larger values indicate poorer earnings quality.  Using equation (1), provided in the 
Appendix, we decompose the earnings quality metrics into innate and discretionary components.  
 Information asymmetry.  Our first information asymmetry measure, Impact, is based on the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, following Huang and Stoll (1996), and is 
expressed in terms of percentage price impact, given in equation (3) in the Appendix.  Our second 
information asymmetry measure, PIN, is the unconditional probability that a randomly selected 
trade originates from an informed trader, and is given in equation (4) in the Appendix.  Brown et 
al. (2004) provide a conceptual discussion and description of the empirical estimation of PIN. 
 Cost of equity.  Our main cost of equity proxy (CofE) follows Brav et al.’s (2005) use of 
Value Line (VL) forecasts of price, dividend and growth, given in equation (5) in the Appendix. 
This CofE measure has been used by Brav et al. (2005) and Francis et al. (2004), and is 
qualitatively the same as the VL-based measure used by Botosan and Plumlee (2002, 2008).  
Research shows that the VL CofE measure has good construct validity (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee 
2005, Botosan et al. 2009).  While we believe the literature indicates the VL CofE measure is 
preferred, we recognize that there is no consensus on the best measure of the cost of equity.  
Consequently, we report (section IV.4.2) results of sensitivity tests with expected returns proxies 
based on realized returns and two earnings-based (rather than target price-based) implied cost of 
capital estimates.   
III.2  Sample and data description 
 Our main sample covers 1993-2005.  The alignment of information asymmetry and cost of 
equity variables is based on the fiscal years used to measure the earnings quality measures.  For 
PIN scores and the Value Line CofE, which are available by calendar quarters, we average the four 
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quarters’ estimates that follow each firm’s fiscal year end.  For example, the PIN score and the 
CofE for a firm with a fiscal year end in May 2001 are the averages of the estimates for the four 
calendar quarters between July 2001 and June 2002.  Following Bhattacharya et al. (2009), we 
estimate Impact by estimating equation (3, in the Appendix) over the 10 trading days ending two 
weeks before the first quarterly earnings announcement of the following fiscal year. Our intent is to 
ensure that financial information (and thus earnings quality) should be known to market 
participants before we measure information asymmetry and cost of equity. 
 Because we are constrained by Value Line coverage (for the cost of equity estimate) and by 
the existence of sufficient data to calculate earnings quality measures, our sample contains large 
firms (Value Line tends to cover big firms) and stable firms (they have existed for at least seven 
years).16  As shown in Table 1, panel A, our Value Line sample contains between 920 and 1,040 
firms per year (averaging 973) and a total of 12,648 firm-years.  The sample accounts for between 
33% (in 1999) and 53% (in 1994) of the total CRSP market capitalization, with an over-time 
average of 43%.  These proportions are similar to results reported in Brav et al. (2005) and Francis 
et al. (2004), who also use Value Line-based samples.  The number of firms in the sample, 
combined with the percent of total market capitalization accounted for, shows the bias towards 
larger firms.17  The next two columns of panel A show the median return on assets (ROA) in our 
sample (5.06%) exceeds the median ROA of all Compustat firms (2.64%); the time series behavior 
of our sample firms’ ROA is also more stable than the time series in the Compustat population.  
Our sample firms are in general more successful and more stable than the Compustat population, 
although there is substantial cross-sectional variation in profitability within our sample (the 
standard deviation of ROA is .0856; not reported in the table). 
                                                     
16  We also exclude firm-years with negative equity book values (2.1% of all firm-years) in order to be able to use meaningful book-
to-market ratios in (some of) the cost of capital tests.  When we repeat tests (that do not require book-to-market ratios) including 
these firm-years, there is no difference in results. 
17  In section IV.4, we report results based on a sample that does not require Value Line coverage and exhibits less size bias. 
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 Panel B details the distribution of the earnings quality variables, the information asymmetry 
variables, the VL-based cost of equity estimates and beta.  Both the mean (.0394) and median 
(.0310) reported for accruals quality (AQ) are larger than the estimates reported by Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) for their sample of manufacturing firms (.028 and .020, respectively) and similar to 
the estimates reported by Francis et al. (2005) for a broad sample of firms 1970-2001 (.044 and 
.031, respectively).  The standard deviation of AQ, .0311, is roughly the same magnitude as the 
mean/median indicating substantial cross-sectional variation.  The distributional properties for the 
other two earnings quality metrics are similar, in that the standard deviation is as big as the 
mean/median.  Correlation tests (not tabulated) indicate that AQ is correlated .24 and .84 with AA  
and Composite, respectively; and AA is correlated about .50 with Composite.18  Thus, we expect 
that AQ and Composite will behave relatively more similarly to each other in our empirical tests 
than either will to AA . 
 The information asymmetry measure based on the bid-ask spread, the percentage price 
impact (Impact), has a mean (median) of .292 (.174).  Bhattacharya et al. (2009) report a mean 
(median) of .445 (.265).  The lower Impact in our sample is consistent with the bias towards larger 
firms, which have lower information asymmetry (see, e.g., Stoll 2000).  Similarly, in our sample 
PIN exhibits a lower mean (.153) and median (.143) than reported by Easley et al. (2002) 
(mean=.191, median=.185) and Brown et al. (2004) (mean=.182, median=.172).  The cross-
sectional variation in PIN (.061) is comparable to that reported in prior research (Easley et al. 
report a standard deviation of .057; Brown et al. report .077). 
                                                     
18 The Composite variable, the common factor of AQ, |AA| and earnings variability, is correlated .75 with earnings variability (not 
tabulated).  Composite is centered around a negative number.  This is because we performed the factor analysis, by year, on the full 
samples of the three underlying earnings quality attributes, without requiring the existence of CofE and the information asymmetry 
measures.  When we require the other variables, the decrease in the sample size shifts the distribution.  We have reestimated 
Composite on only our sample firm-years, and the resulting Composite measure is correlated .99 with the tabulated Composite 
measure.  Our tests yield virtually identical results using either variable.  
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 Firm-specific betas are estimated over rolling five-year estimation periods.  The distribution 
of betas indicates a fairly wide sample dispersion (standard deviation of .647) around a mean of 
.957.  Our sample’s mean (median) value of 15.4% (14.1%) for the cost of equity is similar to 
results in Brav et al. (2005), who report 15.1% (14.4%) for the portion of their sample period 
(1993-2001) that overlaps with ours. 
 To further calibrate our sample with prior research,  we regress the cost of equity on 
earnings quality and information asymmetry variables, transformed into decile ranks, so that we 
can interpret the coefficients as the incremental cost of equity effect of moving from one decile to 
the next (control variables such as beta, size and BM retain their raw values).  The results (not 
tabulated) show that when we regress CofE on decile-ranked AQ, the coefficient is .0062, 
indicating a 62 basis point (bp) change per AQ decile; the difference between the top and bottom 
AQ deciles is 5.6 percentage points (nine steps of .62% each).  The effect is, predictably, 
diminished controlling for the CAPM and the 3-factor model, 51 and 41 bp per AQ decile, 
respectively.  Francis et al. (2004) use a longer period (1975-2001) and report an effect of 41 bp 
per AQ decile, controlling for the 3-factor model.  Relative to AQ, the 3-factor controlled |AA| 
effect is smaller and the Composite effect is larger, 22bp and 59bp per decile, respectively; all 
effects are significant at the .001 level; statistical inference here and in the tests that follow is based 
on standard errors clustered by firm and year, as derived by Cameron et al. (2006) and Thompson 
(2009) and applied by Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010).  We conclude that the cost of equity 
effects of all three earnings quality metrics in our sample are similar in magnitude to effects 
demonstrated in prior research.  We next investigate how these cost of equity effects work. 
IV.  RESULTS OF PATH ANALYSES 
 Section IV.1 presents results of a path analysis of the cost of equity effects of total earnings 
quality.  Section IV.2 contains results from alternative asset pricing model specifications, the 
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CAPM and the 3-factor model.  Section IV.3 reports results for innate and discretionary 
components of earnings quality and section IV.4 reports results of additional analyses. 
IV.1 Direct and mediated cost of equity effects of total earnings quality. 
Our research question concerns the existence and relative importance of direct and indirect 
paths between earnings quality and the cost of equity.  Table 2 presents the results of a path 
analysis with one source variable (earnings quality, measured as accruals quality (AQ), absolute 
abnormal accruals (|AA|) and the composite factor (Composite).  Panels A and B present results for 
information asymmetry measured as the adverse selection portion of the bid-ask spread (Impact) 
and PIN, respectively.  We denote correlations with r and path coefficients with p. 
 Panel A shows results for information asymmetry measured by Impact, beginning with r, 
the Pearson correlation between the cost of equity and earnings quality.  This correlation is about 
.23 for AQ, about .15 for |AA|, and about .30 for Composite (significant at the .001 level or better).  
The direct and mediated paths decompose this correlation into the portion attributable to the direct 
link between earnings quality and the cost of equity and the indirect link, mediated by information 
asymmetry.  p[EQ, CofE] is the direct path coefficient;  the ratio of this path coefficient to the total 
correlation (labeled percentage in the table) is the portion of the correlation between earnings 
quality and the cost of equity that is attributable to the direct path.  Similarly, p[EQ, Impact] and 
p[Impact, CofE] are the path coefficients between earnings quality and information asymmetry and 
between information asymmetry and the cost of equity, respectively.  The mediated path is the 
product of p[EQ, Impact] and p[Impact, CofE].  The ratio of the mediated path to the total 
correlation, labeled percentage, captures the portion of the correlation between earnings quality 
and the cost of equity that is attributable to the mediated effect. 
 As shown in Table 2, panel A, the correlation between AQ and CofE is about 81% 
attributable to a direct path between AQ and CofE  and about 19% attributable to the mediated 
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path; analogous results for |AA| and Composite are about 73% and 83%, respectively.  Both direct 
and mediated paths are highly significant.  Results are thus similar across our three measures of 
earnings quality, in that all direct and mediated paths are reliably non-zero and the direct link is 
substantially more important than the indirect (mediated via Impact) link.  Results in Panel B of 
Table 2, using PIN as the measure of information asymmetry, suggest that the total correlation is 
about 10% attributable to the mediated path for AQ, and about 12% and 8% for |AA| and 
Composite, respectively.  Inspection of the individual path coefficients reveals that the reduced 
importance of the mediated path in this specification is due to less important links between 
earnings quality and PIN and between PIN and CofE, relative to results for Impact.  Taken 
together, the results in Table 2 suggest that the mediated (by information asymmetry) link between 
earnings quality and the cost of equity is reliably nonzero, smaller than the direct link, and more 
important for the Impact measure of information asymmetry than for the PIN measure.19 
IV.2 CAPM and 3-factor model specifications. 
 The results reported in Table 2 do not control for other factors known to affect the cost of 
equity, such as beta (according to the CAPM, Sharpe 1964, Lintner 1965), or the book-to-market 
ratio (BM) and size (Fama and French 1993).  To the extent these other factors are correlated with 
earnings quality or information asymmetry, part of their cost of equity effect will be ascribed to the 
variable(s) with which they are correlated (for example, size is correlated with earnings quality and 
information asymmetry; e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002, Amihud and Mendelson 1986). 
 Table 3 repeats the analyses reported in Table 2, taking a CAPM perspective and including 
beta as a source variable that is posited to have a direct path to the cost of equity, and therefore to 
act like a control variable in a regression.  Based on previous research we do not expect allowing 
                                                     
19 To test the over-time stability of reported results, we also estimate the paths separately each sample year.  The direct path always 
dominates the mediated path.  For example, the direct path from AQ to CofE accounts for more than 75% of the total AQ-CofE 
correlation in all years but one (1998, when the direct path accounts for 63%). 
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for a direct path from beta to the cost of equity will substantially weaken the direct path from 
earnings quality to the cost of equity.  However, results in, for example, Francis et al. (2005) also 
suggest that earnings quality and beta are related, so this path analysis may be empirically 
oversimplified.  In addition, Lambert et al.’s (2007) CAPM-based model predicts a mediated (by 
beta) path between earnings quality and the cost of equity.20  Therefore, in panels C and D, we 
report the results of a path analysis that posits a path between earnings quality and the cost of 
equity that is mediated by both information asymmetry and beta. 
 Results in Table 3, panels A and B, are generally consistent with expectations, in that the 
direct and mediated paths between all three measures of earnings quality and the cost of equity 
remain statistically reliably nonzero (at the .001 level), with the direct link consistently more 
important than the mediated (by information asymmetry) link.  In these specifications, the portion 
of the correlation between earnings quality and the cost of equity that is attributable to the direct 
path decreases to about 61%, 57% and 64%, for AQ, |AA|, and Composite, respectively, when 
Impact is the measure of information asymmetry, and 70%, 71%, and 74%, respectively, when PIN 
is the information asymmetry metric.  Panels C and D of Table 3 show results when earnings 
quality is posited to have a direct path and two indirect paths, via beta and information asymmetry; 
the latter is not affected by this change (that is, results for the mediated paths including Impact and 
PIN are the same as in panels A and B).  Allowing for a path between earnings quality and beta 
means the model is just identified and, therefore, explains 100% of the total correlation between 
earnings quality and cost of equity.  Consistent with Lambert et al. (2007), the path coefficient 
between all three earnings quality measures and beta is non-trivial, ranging from .11 in the case of 
                                                     
20 In a specification that omits a path the percentages of correlation explained by all the estimated paths may not add to 100%. That 
is, the omission of one or more paths means that some of the total correlation that is decomposed by the path analysis would be 
attributable to a path (or paths) that is not estimated.  In addition, the direct path between a source variable and an outcome variable 
can appear to explain more than 100% of the raw correlation between them when the source variable’s correlation with another 
variable is omitted (in this case the omitted correlation is between earnings quality and beta). 
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|AA| to .38 in the case of Composite; all coefficients are highly significant.  The total mediated path 
from earnings quality to beta to the cost of equity explains about 16%-19% of the correlation 
between earnings quality and the cost of equity, regardless of the measure of information 
asymmetry (Impact in panel C and PIN in panel D).  Treating beta as a causal variable or as a 
mediated variable does not affect our basic finding, however, that the direct path from  earnings 
quality to the cost of equity dominates the indirect path through information asymmetry.21 
Table 4 introduces beta, size and book-to-market as additional source or causal variables, 
allowing each to take a direct path to CofE.  Results in panel A, using Impact as the measure of 
information asymmetry, indicate statistically significant direct paths between earnings quality, 
beta, size, book-to-market, and CofE.  The direct path between earnings quality and CofE explains 
about 60%, 53% and 67% of the correlation, when earnings quality is measured by AQ, |AA|, and 
Composite, respectively.  The indirect path that includes Impact as a mediating variable explains 
about 12%, 17% and 11% of the correlation between earnings quality and the cost of equity for 
AQ, |AA|, and Composite, respectively; all results are reliably non-zero at the .01 level.  Panel B of 
Table 4 reports results for PIN as the measure of information asymmetry.  The direct path between 
earnings quality and CofE explains about 64%, 60% and 72% of the correlation between AQ, |AA|, 
and Composite, respectively, while the mediated path that includes PIN explains virtually none of 
the correlation between earnings quality and CofE.  The path coefficient between earnings quality 
and PIN is reliably nonzero for all three earnings quality measures, but the path coefficient between 
PIN and CofE is not (t-statistics are below 1 in magnitude).  We believe this result is likely due to 
the previously-discussed PIN-size sensitivity; when we rerun this estimation using only beta and 
book-to-market, results are similar to those obtained using only beta. 
                                                     
21 Taking an alternative view about causation between earnings quality and beta, i.e., high beta is a primitive measure of business 
risk to which earnings quality responds, does not alter the main result.  The direct path always dominates the mediated path between 
earnings quality and the cost of equity.  Specifically, the path coefficients between earnings quality, information asymmetry and cost 
of equity are the same regardless whether one posits causality from earnings quality to beta or the other way around. 
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 Taken together, we believe the results in Tables 2-4 indicate statistically reliable direct and 
indirect (mediated by information asymmetry) paths between earnings quality and the cost of 
equity.  In both unconditional tests and tests that condition on beta alone and, separately, beta along 
with size and book-to-market, more of the total correlation between earnings quality and the cost of 
equity is attributable to the direct path (the direct path is between twice and nine times as important 
as the indirect path).  We find stronger and more consistent mediated effects when we measure 
information asymmetry as the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (Impact) than 
when we use PIN (the PIN-to-cost of equity link is insignificant in the presence of a control for 
size).  However, the weak PIN results in the presence of size cannot be taken as evidence of a null 
effect for information asymmetry in the presence of size control, because Impact has a reliably 
non-zero effect, regardless of size control variables.  Results in Table 3 are also consistent with the 
existence of an indirect path, mediated by beta, from earnings quality to the cost of equity, as 
suggested by Lambert et al. (2007) in a CAPM setting. 
IV.3.1 Direct and mediated effects of innate and discretionary earnings quality. 
We separate earnings quality into orthogonalized innate and discretionary components 
following procedures outlined in Francis et al. (2005) and in the Appendix, and examine whether 
the relative importance of the indirect path between earnings quality and the cost of equity differs 
for the portion of earnings quality that arises from features of the firm’s business model and 
operating environment (the innate portion) versus the portion unrelated to such innate factors and 
therefore more immediately under management control (the discretionary portion).  Table 5 
contains the results of the basic path analysis for the innate (Panel A) and discretionary (Panel B) 
components of earnings quality. From Panel A, the Pearson correlation r between innate earnings 
quality and the cost of equity is about .31 to .32, of which about 79-82% is attributable to the direct 
path between innate earnings quality and the cost of equity with the remainder attributable to the 
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indirect path, mediated by Impact. 22  All paths are highly significant.  These results are broadly 
consistent with those in Table 2 for total earnings quality, although the path coefficients between 
innate earnings quality and Impact (about .25-.30) tend to exceed the coefficients between total 
earnings quality and Impact (about .14-.21, in Panel A of Table 2). 
 Results for discretionary earnings quality are, as expected, more modest.  Panel B of Table 
5 shows that the correlation between discretionary earnings quality and the cost of equity is about 
.06 for AQ, about .04 for |AA|, and about .09 for Composite, less than one-third the correlation for 
innate earnings quality.  All correlations are statistically significant at conventional levels.  More 
than 90% of this correlation can be attributed to the direct path from discretionary earnings quality 
to the cost of equity when earnings quality is measured as either AQ or Composite, and around 79% 
when earnings quality is measured as |AA|.  The statistical significance of the mediated path is also 
weak, with t-statistics ranging from 1.13 to 1.92, depending on the earnings quality measure.23  In 
untabulated tests, we repeat the path analyses for innate and discretionary earnings quality reported 
in Table 5 including beta as a source variable and, separately, including beta, book-to-market and 
size.  The conclusions are similar to those suggested by the results in Table 5. 
We interpret the results in Table 5 as indicating that management’s reporting decisions, 
proxied by discretionary earnings quality, have a weaker overall relation with information 
asymmetry than does innate earnings quality.  We conjecture that this result is due to the effects 
described by Guay et al. (1996); in a broad sample like ours, management’s reporting decisions, 
which determine discretionary earnings quality, are a mixture of performance-revealing 
information (which would increase reporting quality), manipulations and noise (both of which are 
                                                     
22 In these and later tests, only results for information asymmetry measured as Impact are tabulated; results based on PIN are 
consistent except for the previously-discussed size-related effects. 
23  The mediated path is relatively most important when discretionary earnings quality is measured as |AA|.  We speculate that this 
result might be attributable to the nature of |AA|.  This measure was originally developed to capture management’s reporting 
decisions over and above those determined by accounting fundamentals and was therefore intended to be primarily discretionary. 
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expected to reduce reporting quality), with the result that discretionary earnings quality is not as 
pure a measure of information risk as is innate earnings quality, which is determined by business 
models and operating environments.  These results reinforce a point made by Guay et al., and 
others, that it is difficult to draw inferences about the intent behind management’s reporting 
decisions in broad samples. 
IV.3.2  Alternative specifications for innate and discretionary earnings quality. 
If earnings quality and information asymmetry are mutually determined by another 
variable, we may ascribe causality to what in reality could be spurious correlation.  For example, 
prior literature documents that firm size is correlated with both earnings quality and information 
asymmetry.  Because discretionary earnings quality is already orthogonalized with respect to 
known determinants of earnings quality, this potential problem would arise primarily in the innate 
earnings quality analysis.  Another potential specification issue concerns causality between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry.  The theory on which we base this study predicts that 
causality to flow from earnings quality to information asymmetry, and our research design reflects 
this prediction:  earnings quality measurement precedes the measurement of information 
asymmetry.  However, if management makes accounting decisions at least partly with a view 
towards the expected effect on information asymmetry in capital markets, there could be both a 
path from earnings quality to information asymmetry and a path from information asymmetry to 
earnings quality.  Because the dual path involves managerial intent, this should primarily be an 
issue for discretionary earnings quality, as long as our separation of earnings quality into innate and 
discretionary portions is (at least relatively) exact. 
 To investigate these possible issues of causation, we specify a non-recursive model that 
includes a vector of potential determinants as well as a feedback loop between innate/discretionary 
earnings quality and information asymmetry, consisting of two separable paths: 
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Figure 2:  Non-recursive model with feedback loop (paths a and b) 
 
By including variables correlated with both earnings quality and information asymmetry in 
the determinants vector, we can analyze the path structure in the presence of correlated variables 
(similar to using control variables in a regression).  The specification also allows us to investigate 
the importance of the path from innate/discretionary earnings quality to information asymmetry 
relative to the reverse path.  Therefore, we can formally test to what extent the data support our 
assumption about the causal flow between the two variables.24 
To choose potential joint determinants of earnings quality and information asymmetry we 
proceed in two steps.  First, prior literature (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002, Francis et al. 2005) 
shows that earnings quality is correlated with firm size, cash flow volatility, sales volatility, 
operating cycle, loss propensity, intangibles intensity, and capital intensity; research also shows 
(e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 1986, Stoll 2000, Easley et al. 2005) that information asymmetry 
among investors is correlated with firm size, the level of stock price, trading volume, and 
profitability.  Both size and loss propensity/profitability (we interpret loss propensity and 
profitability as conceptually related) are correlated with both earnings quality and information 
asymmetry, and as such are potential joint determinants.  Second, we analyze all other 
determinants of either earnings quality or information asymmetry; if the correlation between any of 
those variables and both earnings quality and information asymmetry exceeds 10%, we include that 
                                                     
24 Path analysis models that include a feedback loop are called non-recursive.  We refer to sources such as Timm (2002) for a more 
thorough discussion.  Briefly, the estimation of feedback loops requires the inclusion in the estimation of instruments for at least one 
of the variables between which a feedback loop is hypothesized.  
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variable in the set of potential joint determinants.  Both cash flow volatility and sales volatility 
meet this criterion, so we focus on four potential joint determinants:  firm size ( jtAssets ), 
profitability (ROAjt), cash flow volatility ( ( ) jtCFOσ ), and ( ) jtSalesσ . 
The results of the non-recursive path analysis (not tabulated) reveal that the path coefficient 
(path a) from InnateAQ, (Innate|AA|), [InnateComposite] to Impact is .1442, (.1614), [.1746], 
whereas the feedback path (path b) from Impact to InnateAQ, (Innate|AA|), [InnateComposite] is 
.0351, (.0321), [.0363].  All of these path coefficients are significant at the .05 level or better.  We 
conclude that there appears to be a limited (in magnitude) feedback path from information 
asymmetry to earnings quality; the path from innate earnings quality to Impact dominates the 
reverse path by a factor of between four and five in magnitude.25   
Non-recursive path models require the calculation of a “loop-enhanced” effect to arrive at 
the total effect of one variable on another.  The total mediated (by Impact) path from innate 
earnings quality to cost of equity, therefore, includes the loop enhancement, which builds on an 
assumption of an infinite loop that describes the equilibrium relation between variables.  The 
enhancement factor is a function of 1/(1–a×b), where a and b are the initial path coefficient and the 
feedback path coefficient, respectively.  Because the feedback path (b) is small, the loop 
enhancement factor is very small, and does not affect our overall conclusions. 
More important for the innate earnings quality analysis is how the path between innate 
earnings quality and information asymmetry is affected by the inclusion of variables that are 
correlated with both.  As reported above, the direct path coefficients range from .1442 to .1746.  
The corresponding coefficients without correlated variables, reported in Panel A of Table 5, range 
from .2545 to .3054.  While the path coefficients decline by as much as half, inferences about the 
                                                     
25 If we include all determinants of earnings quality and information asymmetry (without requiring that prior literature has identified 
them as determinants of both, or that they have at least 10% correlation with both variables), results are similar.  The path from 
InnateEQ to Impact dominates the reverse path by a factor of six or higher, depending on the earnings quality metric. 
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importance of the mediated and direct paths are qualitatively unchanged:  the total mediated (by 
Impact) path still accounts for a modest portion of the total effect of innate earnings quality on the 
cost of equity, between 11.25% and 12.77%  (compared to 18.43% to 21.13% without controls). 
The reduction in the (absolute) magnitude of the path coefficients is to be expected, because 
the four joint determinant variables are a subset of the innate business model variables that define 
innate earnings quality in the first place.  Therefore, these variables will subsume part of the innate 
earnings quality effect.  To the extent the joint determinant variables are comprehensive, our design 
can also rule out spurious correlation between innate earnings quality and information asymmetry.  
We cannot assess how much of the reduction in magnitude of the mediated path is due to removing 
part of innate earnings quality and how much is due to reduced spurious correlation.  Regardless, 
however, our main conclusions regarding the cost of capital links remain unaffected.  The effect of 
innate EQ on the cost of equity capital is dominated by the direct path (roughly 80-90% of the total 
effect) and the indirect path (mediated by Impact) is substantially smaller (roughly 10-20%). 
The mediated path for discretionary earnings quality is small, as reported in Panel B of 
Table 5.  Applying the non-recursive design, including controls, similar to the innate earnings 
quality analysis above, does not change this result.  Specifically, the feedback path (path b) is very 
small and never significant at conventional levels.  Because the original unidirectional path is 
statistically weak to begin with, however (with t-statistics between 1.15 and 1.99, from Panel B of 
Table 5), we hesitate to draw  conclusions beyond noting that none of the inferences from Panel B 
of Table 5 changes when we apply the non-recursive design.  In particular, we find no statistically 
reliable reverse path (path b) from information asymmetry to discretionary earnings quality. 
IV.3.3  Summary of results concerning innate and discretionary earnings quality 
In summary, splitting earnings quality into an innate portion (tied to the firm’s business 
model and operating environment) and a discretionary portion (under more immediate management 
 30
control) does not alter the message from the main tests in our study:  the dominant path in the 
earnings quality-cost of equity relation is the direct path.  The indirect path, mediated by 
information asymmetry, is substantially less important, and particularly so in the case of 
discretionary earnings quality.  Allowing for feedback loops between innate/discretionary earnings 
quality and control variables to test for omitted joint determinants of earnings quality and 
information asymmetry also does not affect the main conclusions:  the indirect path is relatively 
small in magnitude, but non-trivial in the case of innate earnings quality.  Our feedback tests are 
largely (but not fully) consistent with the theoretically-based assumption that both innate and 
discretionary earnings quality causally precede information asymmetry among investors. 
VI.4.1  Effects of market competitiveness.   
 Based on Lambert et al.’s (2008) suggestion that the indirect path can occur in imperfectly 
competitive markets, we expect that the indirect path would be relatively more important when 
market competitiveness is low than when it is high.  To test this expectation we re-estimate the path 
analysis after segmenting the sample by high versus low market competitiveness.  We measure 
competitiveness as the levels of information asymmetry, analyst forecast dispersion, and stock 
price, guided by Stoll’s (2000) discussion and analysis of indicators of capital market frictions,26 
and by the view that analyst consensus reflects capital market consensus, i.e., low information 
asymmetry among investors (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993, Barron et al. 1998, Levi and Zhang 
2008).  We measure analyst forecast dispersion based on all I/B/E/S analyst forecasts in the last 
fiscal quarter of the prior fiscal year (scaled by average stock price).  We sort firms into annual 
portfolios of high and low market competitiveness based on above or below the median values of 
                                                     
26  Stoll (2000) identifies the levels of information asymmetry variables as measures of the “friction” that he considers.  (We place 
the word “friction” in quotes because, as Stoll notes in section IB, in models that propose information-based difficulties in trading 
assets, the market mechanism itself is frictionless; the issue is protection against losses from trading with better informed traders.)  
He also identifies stock price as an instrument for friction (intuitively, a stock trading at $2 carries higher information 
asymmetry/liquidity risk than a stock trading at, say, $20).  
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the three measures.  High market competitiveness firms are characterized by low information 
asymmetry, low forecast dispersion, and high stock price in a given year. 
Table 6 contains the results of our analysis.  The Mediated Path measures the importance of 
the average indirect (mediated) path, i.e., the product of the path coefficient from earnings quality 
to information asymmetry and the path coefficient from information asymmetry to cost of equity 
(similar to the total mediated path reported in the main tests).   For all three measures of earnings 
quality, the indirect path is more (less) important in the low (high) competitiveness subsample.  For 
example, when AQ is the earnings quality measure, the mediated path is .0013 (t=.52) for low 
information asymmetry firms vs. .0322 (t=3.38) for high information asymmetry firms, the 
mediated path is .0109 (t=2.12) for low forecast dispersion firms vs. .0382 (t=2.84) for high 
forecast dispersion firms, and the mediated path is .0068 (t=2.26) for firms with a high stock price 
vs. .0342 (t=3.47) for firms with a low stock price.  In other words, the mediated path is between 
3.5 and 25 times bigger when market competitiveness is low compared to when it is high.  Results 
are similar for the other measures of earnings quality.  Tests of the difference between high and 
low competitiveness paths when we use Level of Information Asymmetry and Level of Price to 
measure market competitiveness yield t-statistics between 2.49 and 3.29.  However, when we use 
Level of Forecast Dispersion to measure competitiveness, t-statistics are between 1.49 and 1.90. 
We apply two caveats to these results.  First, we acknowledge that there is no single 
generally-accepted empirical measure of capital market competitiveness.  Second, splitting our 
sample based on high versus low Impact, or for that matter on the other discriminating variables, 
will naturally decrease the cross-sectional variation in information asymmetry.  To the extent the 
discriminating variables are correlated with our measures of earnings quality and expected returns, 
the cross-sectional variation in both earnings quality and the cost of equity will also decrease.  
However, the sample split into high and low competitiveness portfolios does not predetermine the 
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relative importance of the indirect paths within the portfolios.  We therefore cautiously conclude 
that the importance of the mediated (by information asymmetry) path from earnings quality to the 
cost of equity is higher when markets are less competitive, and interpret this result as broadly 
consistent with arguments in Lambert et al. (2008).  Information asymmetry has little importance 
for the relation between earnings quality and cost of equity when markets are highly competitive, 
and plays a more important (but still not dominating) role when market competitiveness is lower. 
VI.4.2  Realized returns-based measure of the cost of equity   
 The results reported in Tables 2-6 are based on the Value Line cost of equity proxy, a 
measure that has been shown to have high construct validity relative to alternative implied cost of 
capital measures (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee 2005, Botosan et al. 2009).27  To assess the sensitivity 
of our main results to the use of a cost of equity proxy based on realized returns, we calculate 
expected returns from a four-factor model, consisting of the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor 
model plus an accruals quality mimicking factor, as described in the Appendix. The correlations 
between the returns based measure of the cost of equity and AQ, |AA|, and Composite are .1839,  
.1196 and .2267, respectively (not tabulated), somewhat lower than the correlations reported in 
Table 2 for the Value Line measure of cost of equity (.2264, .1479, and .2986).  The results of our 
basic path analysis show that the indirect path (mediated by Impact) accounts for 8.44%, 12.80%, 
and 6.11% of the overall cost of equity effect of AQ, |AA|, and Composite, respectively, when we 
use the realized returns measure of cost of equity (all results are significant at the .01 level or 
better).  We conclude that using a realized returns based measure of the cost of equity does not 
                                                     
27  Botosan and Plumlee (2005) find that a PEG-based implied cost of capital measure also has relatively high construct validity.  
Easton and Monahan (2005), however, investigate a number of earnings forecast based cost of capital metrics including PEG , and 
conclude that no metric based on earnings forecasts is predictably related to future returns.  Gode and Mohanram (2008) argue that 
the weak results in Easton and Monahan can be ascribed to poor quality earnings forecasts, and develop a correction for predictable 
forecast biases.  As a sensitivity test, we estimate a PEG-based implied cost of capital measure and an Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005) based measure after applying the earnings forecast adjustment routine described in Gode and Mohanram.  The conclusions 
are unaffected in that the indirect path is always statistically significant and always dominated by the direct path. 
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qualitatively alter our main conclusion:  the direct earnings quality path to the cost of equity capital 
dominates the mediated (by Impact) path, although the mediated path is non-trivial. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 For a broad sample of Value Line firms covering 1993-2005, we examine the path that links 
earnings quality, as a proxy for information risk, to the cost of equity.  We interpret models 
developed by Lambert et al. (2007, 2008) as predicting a direct path from earnings quality to the 
cost of equity, an indirect path mediated by information asymmetry under conditions of imperfect 
capital market competition, and an indirect path mediated by beta in a CAPM setting.  Using path 
analysis, we test for the existence and relative importance of these paths, using three measures of 
earnings quality and two measures of information asymmetry.  Our results provide statistically 
reliable evidence of both a direct path and an indirect path, with the direct path having greater 
(often, much greater) importance than the indirect path.  While the indirect path increases in 
importance in settings with lower market competitiveness, the direct path always dominates.  In 
addition, the innate component of earnings quality that is associated with the firm’s business model 
and operating environment has a stronger association with the cost of equity than does the 
remaining component, which we associate with management’s financial reporting decisions. 
 When we measure information asymmetry based on the adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread, our results are robust to the inclusion of beta, size and the book-to-market ratio as 
additional source variables in the path analysis.  When we measure information asymmetry using 
PIN, the probability of informed trading, the inclusion of size, but not beta and the book-to-market 
ratio, reduces the importance of the mediated path.  In general, the mediated (by information 
asymmetry) path is relatively more important when we measure information asymmetry with 
reference to the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, although the direct path 
between earnings quality and the cost of equity is more important in all specifications.  In addition, 
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we find evidence of an indirect path from earnings quality to the cost of equity, mediated by beta, 
as predicted by Lambert et al. (2007) in a CAPM setting. 
 Our results shed light on the means by which information risk, which we proxy as earnings 
quality, affects the cost of equity.  We interpret our results as documenting a direct link, that is, a 
direct effect of earnings quality on the cost of equity, and two indirect links:  one in which earnings 
quality operates through market microstructure variables that are intended to capture information 
asymmetry and one in which earnings quality operates through beta.  While all three links are 
supported by theory, we view the relative importance of the various links between earnings quality 
and the cost of equity as an empirical question.  Our results show that while both the direct and the 
indirect links are reliably nonzero, the direct link is (much) more important.   
 Previous research on the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity has 
tended (implicitly or explicitly) to attribute that association primarily, or even entirely, to an 
indirect path that is mediated by information asymmetry (for example, Aboody et al. (2005), Barth 
et al. (2006), Barone (2003), Berger et al. (2006), Bhattacharya et al. (2003), and Francis et al. 
(2004, 2005)).  We interpret our results as suggesting that this attribution is incomplete.  There are 
at least two other paths in addition to the one that operates through information asymmetry, and the 
direct path between earnings quality and the cost of equity is empirically the most substantial. 
 In addition to providing evidence on the nature of the association between information risk, 
as measured by earnings quality, and the cost of equity, our results also have implications for 
efforts to improve the allocation of capital by altering information structures.  Our results suggest 
that if there is a tradeoff between altering information structures to improve the quality or precision 
of information, for example, by improving authoritative accounting guidance or the effectiveness 
of financial reporting implementations, and altering those structures to increase the equality of 
access to information, the former (precision) effect dominates the latter (asymmetry) effect. 
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APPENDIX 
 This appendix provides the equations and data used to estimate innate and discretionary 
components of earnings quality, the two information asymmetry variables Impact and PIN, the 
Value-Line-based measure of the cost of equity and the returns-based measure of the cost of equity. 
Innate and discretionary earnings quality.  We separate the two components of earnings 
quality by regressing, by year (t), each earnings quality metric on innate factors identified in 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2004): 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7
( ) ( )jt t t jt jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt
EQ Assets CFO Sales OperCycle NegEarn
IntIntensity CapIntensity
λ λ λ σ λ σ λ λ
λ λ μ
= + + + + + +
+ +           (1) 
where EQjt  is the respective earnings quality metric for firm j in year t (AQ, |AA|, or Composite), 
jtAssets  is the log of  firm j’s total assets, ( ) jtCFOσ  is the standard deviation of firm j’s cash flow 
from operations scaled by total assets, ( ) jtSalesσ is the standard deviation of firm j’s sales scaled by 
total assets, jtOperCycle  is the log of firm j’s operating cycle, jtNegEarn is the proportion of years 
(over the estimation period) where firm j reported negative net income before extraordinary items, 
jtIntIntensity  is firm j’s average research and development expense plus advertising expense 
divided by sales, and jtCapIntensity is firm j’s average net PPE as a percentage of total assets.
28  The 
predicted value from regression (1) is the proxy for innate earnings quality, and the residual is the 
proxy for discretionary earnings quality. 
 Information asymmetry measures.  We measure information asymmetry two ways:  based 
on the bid-ask spread and based on the probability of informed trading (PIN). The bid-ask spread is 
represented by the highest limit price to buy and the lowest limit price to sell at any point in time.  
However, transactions can occur inside the posted bid and ask quotes (e.g., Lee 1993, Peterson and 
                                                     
28  The firm-specific standard deviations, means and proportions used as variables in equation (3) are measured over the same seven 
year period over which accruals quality is measured.   
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Fialkowski 1994), while an order whose size exceeds the quoted quantity at the best prices could 
be completed at a price outside the bid-ask spread.  Consequently, the simple bid-ask spread does 
not necessarily capture trading costs for transactions occurring either inside or outside the posted 
quotes.  A measure of trading costs (e.g., Huang and Stoll 1996; Bessembinder and Kaufman 1997) 
that reflects trades inside or outside the quotes is the percentage effective spread defined as: 
Percentage effective spread = 2 × Dit × (Priceit - Midit) / Midit  ×  100 (2) 
where Priceit is the transaction price for security i at time t, Midit is the mid-point of the quoted ask 
and bid prices prior to time t, and Dit is a binary variable that equals "1" for market buy orders and 
"-1" for market sell orders. We use the algorithm suggested in Lee and Ready (1991) to determine 
whether the active side of a trade is a buy or a sell. 
Prior literature has identified three major components of trading costs:  order processing 
cost, inventory holding cost and adverse selection cost, which represents the risk of trading with 
investors with superior private information.  Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue that the adverse 
selection component should be an increasing function of the fraction of traders who are better 
informed and the quality of their superior information.  Huang and Stoll (1996) propose a measure 
of the adverse selection component of spreads, based on how privately informed trades are 
revealed to liquidity providers by order flow imbalances.  Following Huang and Stoll (1996), we 
estimate the information asymmetry reflected in price adjustments (Impact) using the percentage 
price impact measure: 
Percentage price impact = 2 × Dit × (Vi,t+30 - Midit) / Midit ×  100   (3) 
where Vi,t+30,  is a measure of the "intrinsic" economic value of the asset after the trade, proxied by 
the mid-point of the first quote reported at least 30 minutes after the transaction.29 
                                                     
29 Huang and Stoll (1996) report that results are similar across horizons from 5 minutes to 30 minutes. 
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PIN  is computed  as 
b s
PIN αμαμ ε ε= + +      (4)  
where α is the probability of an information event, μ is the rate of informed trade arrival, εb is the 
arrival rate of uninformed buy orders, and εs is the arrival rate of uninformed sell orders.  Our PIN 
scores are taken from Stephen Brown’s web site (http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~sbrow22/ ), 
where he has graciously made them publicly available.  
 Cost of equity measures.  Our main cost of equity proxy (CofE) is derived from Value Line 
(VL) analysts’ four-year-ahead price targets (TP), dividend forecasts (DIV), and dividend growth 
rates (g). Because they are based on forecasts, not realizations, our CofE measures reflect implied 
cost of equity estimates. Assuming that interim dividends are reinvested at the firm cost of equity, 
Brav et al. (2005) arrive at the following expression for the ex ante expected return: 
4 4
4
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
CofE gDIV
CofE gTPCofE
P P
⎡ ⎤+ − +⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦+ = +     (5) 
 where P = stock price nine days prior to the date of the VL report.  For each firm in our sample, 
the value of CofE that satisfies the equality is our estimate of the firm’s implied cost of equity.   
We also use a returns-based measure of the cost of equity, based on the Fama-French 
(1993) 3-factor model augmented by an accruals quality factor: 
it ft i i t i t i t i t itR R a b RMRF s SMB h HML e AQfactor v− = + + + + +    (6) 
where Rit is firm i’s return in month t, Rft is the risk-free rate, RMRFt is the value-weighted market 
return less the risk-free rate, SMBt, HMLt and AQfactort are the returns on a size-mimicking 
portfolio, a book-to-market mimicking portfolio, and an accruals quality mimicking portfolio, 
respectively.  Rft, RMRFt, SMBt, and HMLt are from Kenneth French, as described in Fama and 
French (1993).  AQfactort is from Francis et al. (2005).  We estimate the factor loadings over 
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rolling five-year regressions of monthly returns, and we estimate the expected value of RMRF, 
SMB, HML and AQfactor as the annualized average return over the same five-year interval.  So, for 
example, the expected return of firm i for 2002 is the b, s, h, and e coefficients estimated for the 
firm in equation (6) over 1997-2001, each multiplied by its associated average annual factor 
premium over the same estimation period, 1997-2001.  The procedure is similar to the cost of 
equity calculations using varying asset pricing models in Fama and French (1997), Barth et al.  
(2006), and Berger et al. (2006).30,31 
                                                     
30 The period over which factor premia are averaged varies, from as little as one year (in Barth et al.) to the full sample period (in 
Berger et al.). 
31 Unlike the Value Line CofE measure, which is independent of researcher-specified asset pricing factors, including AQfactor in the 
asset pricing model may to some extent hardwire a connection between earnings quality and the cost of equity.  However, there is 
nothing that pre-specifies which path(s) the connection takes, and the latter is our main research question.  Excluding an earnings 
quality factor from the asset pricing model is less desirable, because the measure of expected return would then be pre-specified not 
to include earnings quality effects, save for indirect effects of earnings quality on other asset pricing factors.  
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Panel A:  Sample characteristics compared to overall market
Fiscal Year No. of firms % Mkt Cap Sample ROA Market ROA
1993 920 52.21% 4.46% 3.09%
1994 951 52.92% 5.17% 3.79%
1995 944 50.10% 5.53% 3.57%
1996 965 48.23% 5.86% 3.57%
1997 984 47.78% 5.63% 3.21%
1998 971 39.92% 5.02% 2.55%
1999 935 33.45% 5.22% 2.60%
2000 955 38.40% 5.04% 1.91%
2001 997 42.48% 3.86% -0.38%
2002 1,026 40.91% 4.08% 0.97%
2003 1,040 37.89% 4.52% 2.19%
2004 995 36.98% 5.60% 3.46%
2005 965 37.21% 5.84% 3.75%
Average 973 42.96% 5.06% 2.64%
Total 12,648
Panel B:  Descriptive information on test variablesa
Mean Std. Dev. 10% 25% Median 75% 90%
AQ 0.0394 0.0311 0.0122 0.0194 0.0310 0.0498 0.0748
|AA| 0.0407 0.0456 0.0049 0.0126 0.0281 0.0536 0.0900
Composite -0.3645 0.4372 -0.7595 -0.6515 -0.4783 -0.2076 0.1561
Impact 0.2916 0.3944 0.0447 0.0851 0.1744 0.3418 0.6294
PIN 0.1531 0.0605 0.0850 0.1090 0.1428 0.1878 0.2366
Beta 0.9573 0.6465 0.2503 0.5141 0.8597 1.2580 1.7937
CofE 0.1538 0.0803 0.0656 0.0991 0.1414 0.1946 0.2541
Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Information on Variables
Table 1
 
Our sample contains all Value Line firms with sufficient data to measure the test variables.  We report data for our sample compared to the CRSP 
population for % Mkt Cap, which measures the ratio of market value of equity for our sample to the market value of the CRSP population.  Market 
ROA is the median ROA of all Compustat firms.  Test variables are defined as follows:  AQ is the Dechow-Dichev (2002) measure of accruals 
quality, capturing the time-series standard deviation of the portion of working capital accruals that does not map into previous-year, current-year, and 
one-year-ahead cash flows; |AA| is absolute abnormal accruals from a modified Jones (1991) model; Composite is the factor score from a factor 
analysis of AQ, |AA| and earnings variability, defined as the firm-specific standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items.  Impact is the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as in Huang and Stoll (1996); PIN is the probability of informed trading variable from Brown et 
al. (2004); beta is the CAPM beta and CofE is the implied cost of equity capital imputed from Value Line analysts’ forecasts of price, dividends and 
growth rates.  Descriptive information is based on 12,648 firm-year observations pooled over 1993-2005. 
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Panel A:  Information asymmetry measured as Impact
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
r[EQ, CofE] 0.2264 11.72 0.1479 6.41 0.2986 13.39
Direct Path
     p[EQ, CofE] 0.1827 10.37 0.1077 5.59 0.2472 11.70
    percentage 80.69% 72.77% 82.79%
Mediated Path
     p[EQ, Impact] 0.1627 5.80 0.1424 5.59 0.2082 6.52
     p[Impact, CofE] 0.2686 6.38 0.2830 6.85 0.2468 6.26
  Total mediated path 0.0437 4.29 0.0403 4.33 0.0514 4.52
    percentage 19.31% 27.23% 17.21%
Panel B:  Information asymmetry measured as PIN
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
r[EQ, CofE] 0.2264 11.72 0.1479 6.41 0.2986 13.39
Direct Path
     p[EQ, CofE] 0.2043 10.65 0.1298 6.02 0.2758 12.37
    percentage 90.25% 87.72% 92.34%
Mediated Path
     p[EQ, PIN] 0.1203 6.78 0.0926 5.06 0.1336 6.55
     p[PIN, CofE] 0.1835 7.10 0.1960 7.52 0.1712 6.64
  Total mediated path 0.0221 4.90 0.0182 4.20 0.0229 4.66
    percentage 9.75% 12.28% 7.66%
Composite|AA|AQ
Earnings Quality Measure
Table 2
Direct and Mediated Cost of Equity Effects of Earnings Quality
Earnings Quality Measure
AQ |AA| Composite
 
The table reports path analyses of the links between earnings quality and CofE, a direct link and a link mediated by information asymmetry.  p 
indicates path coefficients and r indicates (Pearson) correlation coefficients.  CofE is the imputed cost of equity from Value Line analysts’ forecasts 
of price, dividends and growth rates  AQ is the Dechow-Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality, capturing the time-series standard deviation of 
the portion of working capital accruals that does not map into previous-year, current-year, and one-year-ahead cash flows; |AA| is absolute abnormal 
accruals from a modified Jones (1991) model; Composite is the factor score from a factor analysis of AQ, |AA| and earnings variability, defined as the 
firm-specific standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items.  Impact is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as in Huang 
and Stoll (1996); PIN is the probability of informed trading variable from Brown et al. (2004).  Statistical inference is based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and year.  
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coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
r[EQ, CofE] 0.2264 11.72 0.1479 6.41 0.2986 13.39
Direct Path
     p[EQ, CofE] 0.1389 6.91 0.0837 4.78 0.1908 7.79
    percentage 61.36% 56.54% 63.89%
Mediated Path
     p[EQ, Impact] 0.1627 5.80 0.1424 5.59 0.2082 6.52
     p[Impact, CofE] 0.2772 6.44 0.2881 6.85 0.2597 6.31
  Total mediated path 0.0451 4.31 0.0410 4.33 0.0541 4.54
    percentage 19.93% 27.72% 18.11%
Direct Path
     p[Beta, CofE] 0.1819 8.34 0.2048 9.57 0.1417 6.58
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
r[EQ, CofE] 0.2264 11.72 0.1479 6.41 0.2986 13.39
Direct Path
     p[EQ, CofE] 0.1595 7.75 0.1047 5.25 0.2219 8.88
    percentage 70.48% 70.75% 74.31%
Mediated Path
     p[EQ, PIN] 0.1203 6.78 0.0926 5.06 0.1336 6.55
     p[PIN, CofE] 0.1981 7.47 0.2089 7.60 0.1853 7.12
  Total mediated path 0.0238 5.02 0.0194 4.21 0.0247 4.82
    percentage 10.53% 13.08% 8.29%
Direct Path
     p[Beta, CofE] 0.1846 8.35 0.2104 9.11 0.1370 6.43
Panel B:  Beta as source variable and information asymmetry measured as PIN
Earnings Quality Measure
AQ |AA| Composite
AQ |AA| Composite
Table 3
Direct and Mediated Cost of Equity Effects of Earnings Quality - CAPM regime
Panel A:  Beta as source variable and information asymmetry measured as Impact
Earnings Quality Measure
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coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
r[EQ, CofE] 0.2264 11.72 0.1479 6.41 0.2986 13.39
Direct Path
     p[EQ, CofE] 0.1389 6.91 0.0837 4.78 0.1908 7.79
    percentage 61.36% 56.54% 63.89%
Mediated Path (Impact)
     p[EQ, Impact] 0.1627 5.80 0.1424 5.59 0.2082 6.52
     p[Impact, CofE] 0.2772 6.44 0.2881 6.85 0.2597 6.31
  Total mediated path 0.0451 4.31 0.0410 4.33 0.0541 4.54
    percentage 19.93% 27.72% 18.11%
Mediated Path (Beta)
     p[EQ, Beta] 0.2329 7.61 0.1137 7.49 0.3794 6.78
     p[Beta, CofE] 0.1819 8.34 0.2048 9.57 0.1417 6.58
  Total mediated path 0.0424 5.62 0.0233 5.90 0.0538 4.72
    percentage 18.71% 15.74% 18.00%
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
r[EQ, CofE] 0.2264 11.72 0.1479 6.41 0.2986 13.39
Direct Path
     p[EQ, CofE] 0.1595 7.75 0.1047 5.25 0.2219 8.88
    percentage 70.48% 70.75% 74.31%
Mediated Path (PIN)
     p[EQ, PIN] 0.1203 6.78 0.0926 5.06 0.1336 6.55
     p[PIN, CofE] 0.1981 7.47 0.2089 7.60 0.1853 7.12
  Total mediated path 0.0238 5.02 0.0194 4.21 0.0247 4.82
    percentage 10.53% 13.08% 8.29%
Mediated Path (Beta)
     p[EQ, Beta] 0.2329 7.61 0.1137 7.49 0.3794 6.78
     p[Beta, CofE] 0.1846 8.35 0.2104 9.11 0.1370 6.43
  Total mediated path 0.0430 5.62 0.0239 5.79 0.0520 4.67
    percentage 19.00% 16.17% 17.40%
AQ |AA| Composite
|AA| Composite
Panel D:  Beta as mediated variable and information asymmetry measured as PIN
Earnings Quality Measure
Panel C:  Beta as mediated variable and information asymmetry measured as Impact 
Earnings Quality Measure
AQ
Table 3, Continued
 
 
 
The table reports path analyses of the direct and indirect (through information asymmetry) links between earnings quality and CofE.  p indicates path 
coefficients and r indicates (Pearson) correlation coefficients.  Beta is an additional causal variable (panels A and B), or an additional mediating 
variable (Panels C and D).  CofE is the imputed cost of equity from Value Line analysts’ forecasts of price, dividends and growth rates.  AQ is the 
Dechow-Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality, capturing the time-series standard deviation of the portion of working capital accruals that does 
not map into previous-year, current-year, and one-year-ahead cash flows; |AA| is absolute abnormal accruals from a modified Jones (1991) model; 
Composite is the factor score from a factor analysis of AQ, |AA| and earnings variability, defined as the firm-specific standard deviation of earnings 
before extraordinary items.  Impact is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as in Huang and Stoll (1996); PIN is the probability of 
informed trading variable from Brown, Hillegeist and Lo (2004); beta is the CAPM beta.  Statistical inference is based on standard errors clustered 
by firm and year. 
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Panel A:  Information asymmetry measured as Impact
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
r[EQ, CofE] 0.2264 11.72 0.1479 6.41 0.2986 13.39
Direct Path
     p[EQ, CofE] 0.1346 7.71 0.0781 4.82 0.2000 9.25
    percentage 59.47% 52.81% 66.96%
Mediated Path
     p[EQ, Impact] 0.1627 5.80 0.1424 5.59 0.2082 6.52
     p[Impact, CofE] 0.1686 4.40 0.1732 4.66 0.1565 4.20
  Total mediated path 0.0274 3.51 0.0247 3.58 0.0326 3.53
    percentage 12.12% 16.67% 10.91%
Direct Path
     p[Beta, CofE] 0.1947 9.33 0.2160 9.93 0.1525 7.75
Direct Path
     p[Size, CofE] -0.1280 -4.27 -0.1461 -4.53 -0.1007 -3.56
Direct Path
     p[BM, CofE] 0.1613 5.62 0.1488 5.09 0.1863 6.54
Panel B:  Information asymmetry measured as PIN
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
r[EQ, CofE] 0.2264 11.72 0.1479 6.41 0.2986 13.39
Direct Path
     p[EQ, CofE] 0.1454 8.54 0.0884 5.03 0.2163 10.52
    percentage 64.24% 59.74% 72.44%
Mediated Path
     p[EQ, PIN] 0.1203 6.78 0.0926 5.06 0.1336 6.55
     p[PIN, CofE] -0.0363 -0.94 -0.0372 -0.95 -0.0293 -0.79
  Total mediated path -0.0044 -0.93 -0.0034 -0.93 -0.0039 -0.78
    percentage -1.93% -2.33% -1.31%
Direct Path
     p[Beta, CofE] 0.1882 9.10 0.2107 9.76 0.1430 7.17
Direct Path
     p[Size, CofE] -0.2412 -5.83 -0.2632 -6.06 -0.1995 -5.24
Direct Path
     p[BM, CofE] 0.1621 5.46 0.1490 4.91 0.1892 6.47
Composite
Composite|AA|AQ
Table 4
Direct and Mediated Cost of Equity Effects of Earnings Quality - 3-factor regime
Earnings Quality Measure
Earnings Quality Measure
AQ |AA|
 
The table reports path analyses of the direct and indirect (through information asymmetry) links between earnings quality and CofE.  p indicates path 
coefficients and r indicates (Pearson) correlation coefficients.  Beta, Size and BM are additional causal variables.  CofE is the imputed cost of equity 
from Value Line analysts’ forecasts of price, dividends and growth rates.  AQ is the Dechow-Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality, capturing 
the time-series standard deviation of the portion of working capital accruals that does not map into previous-year, current-year, and one-year-ahead 
cash flows; |AA| is absolute abnormal accruals from a modified Jones (1991) model; Composite is the factor score from a factor analysis of AQ, |AA| 
and earnings variability, defined as the firm-specific standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items.  Impact is the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread as in Huang and Stoll (1996); PIN is the probability of informed trading variable from Brown et al. (2004); beta is 
the CAPM beta, and Size and BM are the natural logarithms of market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio, respectively.  Statistical inference 
is based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
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Panel A:  Innate earnings quality
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
r[InnateEQ, CofE] 0.3120 15.05 0.3185 7.82 0.3220 13.19
Direct Path
    p[InnateEQ, CofE] 0.2528 13.61 0.2512 6.90 0.2627 12.33
    percentage 81.03% 78.87% 81.57%
Mediated Path
     p[InnateEQ, Impact] 0.2545 8.29 0.3054 9.02 0.2603 8.07
     p[Impact, CofE] 0.2326 5.86 0.2203 7.01 0.2280 5.97
  Total mediated path 0.0592 4.79 0.0673 5.53 0.0593 4.58
    percentage 18.97% 21.13% 18.43%
Panel B:  Discretionary earnings quality
r[DiscrEQ, CofE] 0.0619 3.75 0.0401 3.19 0.0894 4.78
Direct Path
     p[DiscrEQ, CofE] 0.0563 4.01 0.0315 2.94 0.0842 5.09
    percentage 90.98% 78.58% 94.18%
Mediated Path
     p[DiscrEQ, Impact] 0.0240 1.27 0.0390 1.99 0.0228 1.15
     p[Impact, CofE] 0.2326 5.86 0.2203 7.01 0.2280 5.97
  Total mediated path 0.0056 1.24 0.0086 1.92 0.0052 1.13
    percentage 9.02% 21.42% 5.82%
Table 5
Direct and Mediated Cost of Equity Effects of Innate and Discretionary Earnings Quality
Earnings Quality Measure
AQ |AA| Composite
 
 
The table reports path analyses of the direct and indirect links between earnings quality, separated into innate and discretionary portions, and CofE, 
the imputed cost of equity from Value Line analysts’ forecasts of price, dividends and growth rates.  p indicates path coefficients and r indicates 
(Pearson) correlation coefficients.  Innate earnings quality is the fitted value from a regression of total earnings quality on innate factors identified by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005).  Discretionary earnings quality is the residual from the same regression.  AQ is the Dechow-
Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality, capturing the time-series standard deviation of the portion of working capital accruals that does not map 
into previous-year, current-year, and one-year-ahead cash flows; |AA| is absolute abnormal accruals from a modified Jones (1991) model; Composite 
is the factor score from a factor analysis of AQ, |AA| and earnings variability, defined as the firm-specific standard deviation of earnings before 
extraordinary items.  Impact is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as in Huang and Stoll (1996); PIN is the probability of 
informed trading variable from Brown et al. (2004).  Statistical inference is based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
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Competitiveness
Mediated Path t-statistic Mediated Path t-statistic Mediated Path t-statistic
Level of Information Asymmetry (Impact)
Low 0.0013 0.52 0.0050 1.25 0.0037 1.23
High 0.0322 3.38 0.0368 4.16 0.0386 3.62
Difference 0.0309 3.14 0.0318 3.29 0.0349 3.15
Level of Forecast Dispersion
Low 0.0109 2.12 0.0123 1.84 0.0150 2.44
High 0.0382 2.84 0.0271 3.74 0.0416 3.20
Difference 0.0274 1.90 0.0148 1.49 0.0266 1.85
Level of Price
High 0.0068 2.26 0.0088 2.21 0.0102 2.56
Low 0.0342 3.47 0.0358 4.27 0.0390 3.60
Difference 0.0274 2.66 0.0270 2.91 0.0288 2.49
Composite
Table 6
Mediated Cost of Equity Effects of Earnings Quality for Competitiveness Portfolios
Earnings Quality Measure
AQ |AA|
 
  
The table reports Mediated Path, the association between earnings quality and CofE that is attributable to the indirect path, mediated by information 
asymmetry, Impact.  We separate the sample into two groups based on market competitiveness, proxied by the level of information asymmetry, 
forecast dispersion (measured during the prior fiscal quarter), and stock price.  CofE is the imputed cost of equity from Value Line analysts’ forecasts 
of price, dividends and growth rates. AQ is the Dechow-Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality, capturing the time-series standard deviation of 
the portion of working capital accruals that does not map into previous-year, current-year, and one-year-ahead cash flows; |AA| is absolute abnormal 
accruals from a modified Jones (1991) model; Composite is the factor score from a factor analysis of AQ, |AA| and earnings variability, defined as the 
firm-specific standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items.  Impact is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as in Huang 
and Stoll (1996); PIN is the probability of informed trading variable from Brown et al. (2004).  Statistical inference is based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and year. 
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